Vann McGee: List of Publications

13 March 2007

1. “Finite Matrices and the Logic of Conditionals,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (1982), pp. 349-51.

2. “How Truthlike Can a Predicate Be? A Negative Result,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (1985), pp. 399-410.

3. “A Counterexample to Modus Ponens,” Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985), pp. 462-71.

4. “The Degree of the Set of Sentences of Predicate Provability Logic That Are True Under Every Interpretation” (with George Boolos), Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (1987), pp. 165-71.

5. “Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals,” The Philosophical Review 98 (1989), 99. 485-541.

6. “Applying Kripke’s Theory of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989), pp. 530-39.

7. “We Turing Machines Aren’t Expected-Utility Maximizers (Even Ideally),” Philosophical Studies 64 (1991), pp.115-23.

8. “An Epistemic Principle Which Solves Newcomb’s Paradox” (with Keith Lehrer), Grazer philosophische Studien 40 (1991), pp 197-217.

9. “Reply to Christian Piller,” Grazer philosophische Studien 40 (1991), pp. 229-32.

10. “Particulars, Universals, and Individual Qualities” (with Keith Lehrer) in Kevin Mulligan, ed., Language, Truth, and Ontology (Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), pp. 37-47.

11. “Maximal Consistent Sets of Instances of Tarski’s Schema (T),” Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (1992), pp 235-41.

12. “Two Problems with Tarski’s Theory of Consequence,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1992), pp. 273-92.

13. “Learning the Impossible,” in Brian Skyrms and Ellery Eells, eds., Probability and Conditionals (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 177-99.

14. “Afterword: Truth and Paradox” in Robert M. Harnish, ed., Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp. 615-33.

15. “A Semantic Conception of Truth?” Philosophical Topics 21 (1993), pp. 83-111. Reprinted in Brad Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, eds., Deflationary Truth (New York: Open Court Press), pp. 111-142.

16. “On the Degrees of Unsolvability of Modal Predicate Logics of Provability,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (1994), pp. 253-61.

17. “Distinctions Without a Difference” (with Brian McLaughlin), Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 supplement (1995) (Spindel Conference volume for 1994), pp. 203-52.

18. “Philosophical Logic” in Donald Borchert, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement (New York: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 402-06.

19. “Logical Operations,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (1996), pp. 567-80.

20. “The Complexity of the Modal Predicate Logic of ‘True in Every Transitive Model of ZFC,'” Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (1997), pp. 1371-78.

21. “How We Learn Mathematical Language,” The Philosophical Review 106 (1997), pp. 35-68.

22. “Inductive Definitions and Proofs,” in Edward Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 4, pp. 752-55.

23. “Semantic Paradoxes and Theories of Truth,” in Edward Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 8, pp. 642-48.

24. “Everything,” in Gila Sher and Richard Tieszen, eds., Between Logic and Intuition (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 54-78.

25. “Revision,” Philosophical Issues 8 (1997), pp. 387-406.

26. “Kilimanjaro,” in Ali Kazmi, ed., Meaning and Reference. Canadian Journal of Philosophy supp. vol. 23 (1997), pp.141-98.

27. “An Airtight Dutch Book,” Analysis 59 (1999), pp. 257-65. Reprinted in Patrick Grim, Kenneth Baynes, and Gary Mar, eds., The Philosopher’s Annual, vol 22 (Stanford, California: CSLI Publications, 2000), pp. 155-64.

28. “A Puzzle about De Rebus Beliefs” (with Agustín Rayo), Analysis 60 (2000): 297-99.

29. “The Analysis of ‘ x is True’ as ‘For Every p , if x = “p,” then p,” in André Chapuis and Anil Gupta, eds., Circularity, Definition, and Truth (New Dehli: Indian Council for Philosophical Research, 2000), pp. 255-72.

30. “To Tell the Truth about Conditionals,” Analysis 60 (2000), pp. 107-11.

31. “The Lessons of the Many” (with Brian McLauglin), Philosophical Topics 28 (2000): 128-51.

32. “Truth by Default,” Philosophia Mathematica 9 (2001): 5-20.

33. “Ramsey and the Correspondence Theory,” in Volker Halbach and Leon Horstein, eds., Principles of Truth (Frankfurt: Hänsel-Hohenhausen, 2002), pp. 153-67.

34. “Ramsey’s Dialethism,” in Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Brad Armour-Garb, eds. ThevLaw of Non-Contradiction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 276-291.

35. “The Many Lives of Ebenezer Wilkes Smith,” in Godehard Link, ed., One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004), pp. 611-24.

36. “Universal Universal Quantification,” in Michael Glanzberg and J. C. Beall, eds., Liars and Heaps (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 357-64.

37. “Tarski’s Staggering Existential Assumptions,” Synthese 142 (2004): 371-387.

38. “In Praise of the Free Lunch,” in Vincent F. Hendricks, Stig Andur Pedersen, and Thomas Bollander, eds., Self-Reference (Stanford, California: CSLI, 2006), pp. 95-120.

39. “Truth,” in Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley, eds., Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 392-410.

40. “Afterword: Trying (with Limited Success) to Demarcate the Disquotational/Correspondence Distinction,” in Brad Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, eds., Deflationary Truth (New York: Open Court Press, 2005), pp. 143-52.

41. “Two Conceptions of Truth?” Philosophical Studies 124 (2005): 71-104.

42. “Gödel’s Theorem” in William Craig, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 2006).

43. “Logical Paradoxes,” in William Craig, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 2006).

44. “Inscrutability and Its Discontents,” Noûs 39 (2005): 397-425.

45. “There are Many Things,” in Judith Jarvis Thomson and Alex Byrne, eds., Content and Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 93-122.

46. “There’s a Rule for Everything” in Agustín Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano, eds., Absolute Generality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 179-202.


1. Review of The Liar by Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, The Philosophical Review 100 (1991), pp. 472-74.

2. Review of various articles by Artemov and Vardanyan on the modal logic of provability, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 56 (1991), pp. 329-32.

3. Review of The Concept of Logical Consequence by John Etchemendy, Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (1992), pp. 254-55.

4. Review of If P, then Q by David Sanford, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993), pp. 239-42.

5. Review of A Theory of Counterfactuals by Igal Kvart, Philosophy of Science 60 (1993), pp. 518-19.

6. Review of Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality by Robert Koons, Mind 102 (1993), pp.407-10.

7. Review of Sets by Michael Potter and of articles by van Aken and Pollard on the axiomatization of set theory, Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (1993), pp. 1077-78.

8. Review of A Structuralist Theory of Logic by Arnold Koslow, Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993), pp. 271-74.

9. Review of Logic, Logic, and Logic by George Boolos, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (2001): 58-62.

10. Review of The Revision Theory of Truth by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 727-30.

11. Review of the second edition of The Concept of Logical Consequence by John Etchemendy, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (2001): 379-80.

12. Review of Vagueness by Timothy Williamson (with Brian P. McLaughlin), Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (1998), pp. 221-35.

13. “Logical Commitment: A Reply to Williamson” (with Brian P. McLaughlin), Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (2004): 123-36.

14. Review of The Limits of Abstraction by Kit Fine, Philosophia Mathematica 12 (2004): 278-84.