# Faculty

## Vann McGee: List of Publications

13 March 2007

1. “Finite Matrices and the Logic of Conditionals,” *Journal of Philosophical Logic *10 (1982), pp. 349-51.

2. “How Truthlike Can a Predicate Be? A Negative Result,” *Journal of Philosophical Logic *14 (1985), pp. 399-410.

3. “A Counterexample to *Modus Ponens*,” *Journal of Philosophy *82 (1985), pp. 462-71.

4. “The Degree of the Set of Sentences of Predicate Provability Logic That Are True Under Every Interpretation” (with George Boolos), *Journal of Symbolic Logic *54 (1987), pp. 165-71.

5. “Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals,” *The Philosophical Review *98 (1989), 99. 485-541.

6. “Applying Kripke’s Theory of Truth,” *Journal of Philosophy *86 (1989), pp. 530-39.

7. “We Turing Machines Aren’t Expected-Utility Maximizers (Even Ideally),” *Philosophical Studies *64 (1991), pp.115-23.

8. “An Epistemic Principle Which Solves Newcomb’s Paradox” (with Keith Lehrer), *Grazer philosophische Studien *40 (1991), pp 197-217.

9. “Reply to Christian Piller,” *Grazer philosophische Studien *40 (1991), pp. 229-32.

10. “Particulars, Universals, and Individual Qualities” (with Keith Lehrer) in Kevin Mulligan, ed., *Language, Truth, and Ontology *(Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), pp. 37-47.

11. “Maximal Consistent Sets of Instances of Tarski’s Schema (T),” *Journal of Philosophical Logic *21 (1992), pp 235-41.

12. “Two Problems with Tarski’s Theory of Consequence,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society *92 (1992), pp. 273-92.

13. “Learning the Impossible,” in Brian Skyrms and Ellery Eells, eds., *Probability and Conditionals *(New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 177-99.

14. “Afterword: Truth and Paradox” in Robert M. Harnish, ed., *Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language *(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp. 615-33.

15. “A Semantic Conception of Truth?” *Philosophical Topics *21 (1993), pp. 83-111. Reprinted in Brad Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, eds., *Deflationary Truth *(New York: Open Court Press), pp. 111-142.

16. “On the Degrees of Unsolvability of Modal Predicate Logics of Provability,” *Journal of Symbolic Logic *59 (1994), pp. 253-61.

17. “Distinctions Without a Difference” (with Brian McLaughlin), *Southern Journal of Philosophy *33 supplement (1995) (Spindel Conference volume for 1994), pp. 203-52.

18. “Philosophical Logic” in Donald Borchert, ed., *Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement *(New York: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 402-06.

19. “Logical Operations,” *Journal of Philosophical Logic *25 (1996), pp. 567-80.

20. “The Complexity of the Modal Predicate Logic of ‘True in Every Transitive Model of ZFC,'” *Journal of Symbolic Logic *62 (1997), pp. 1371-78.

21. “How We Learn Mathematical Language,” *The Philosophical Review *106 (1997), pp. 35-68.

22. “Inductive Definitions and Proofs,” in Edward Craig, ed., *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy *(London and New York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 4, pp. 752-55.

23. “Semantic Paradoxes and Theories of Truth,” in Edward Craig, ed., *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy *(London and New York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 8, pp. 642-48.

24. “Everything,” in Gila Sher and Richard Tieszen, eds., *Between Logic and Intuition *(New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 54-78.

25. “Revision,” *Philosophical Issues *8 (1997), pp. 387-406.

26. “Kilimanjaro,” in Ali Kazmi, ed., *Meaning and Reference. **Canadian Journal of Philosophy *supp. vol. 23 (1997), pp.141-98.

27. “An Airtight Dutch Book,” *Analysis *59 (1999), pp. 257-65. Reprinted in Patrick Grim, Kenneth Baynes, and Gary Mar, eds., *The Philosopher’s Annual*, vol 22 (Stanford, California: CSLI Publications, 2000), pp. 155-64.

28. “A Puzzle about *De Rebus *Beliefs” (with Agustín Rayo), *Analysis *60 (2000): 297-99.

29. “The Analysis of ‘ *x *is True’ as ‘For Every *p *, if *x *= “*p*,” then *p*,” in André Chapuis and Anil Gupta, eds., *Circularity, Definition, and Truth *(New Dehli: Indian Council for Philosophical Research*, *2000), pp. 255-72*. *

30. “To Tell the Truth about Conditionals,” *Analysis *60 (2000), pp. 107-11.

31. “The Lessons of the Many” (with Brian McLauglin), *Philosophical Topics *28 (2000): 128-51.

32. “Truth by Default,” *Philosophia Mathematica *9 (2001): 5-20.

33. “Ramsey and the Correspondence Theory,” in Volker Halbach and Leon Horstein, eds., *Principles of Truth *(Frankfurt: Hänsel-Hohenhausen, 2002), pp. 153-67.

34. “Ramsey’s Dialethism,” in Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Brad Armour-Garb, eds. *ThevLaw of Non-Contradiction *(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 276-291.

35. “The Many Lives of Ebenezer Wilkes Smith,” in Godehard Link, ed., *One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox *(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004), pp. 611-24.

36. “Universal Universal Quantification,” in Michael Glanzberg and J. C. Beall, eds., *Liars and Heaps *(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 357-64.

37. “Tarski’s Staggering Existential Assumptions,” *Synthese *142 (2004): 371-387.

38. “In Praise of the Free Lunch,” in Vincent F. Hendricks, Stig Andur Pedersen, and Thomas Bollander, eds., *Self-Reference *(Stanford, California: CSLI, 2006), pp. 95-120.

39. “Truth,” in Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley, eds., *Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language *(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 392-410.

40. “Afterword: Trying (with Limited Success) to Demarcate the Disquotational/Correspondence Distinction,” in Brad Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, eds., *Deflationary Truth *(New York: Open Court Press, 2005), pp. 143-52.

41. “Two Conceptions of Truth?” *Philosophical Studies *124 (2005): 71-104.

42. “Gödel’s Theorem” in William Craig, ed., *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 2006).

43. “Logical Paradoxes,” in William Craig, ed., *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 2006).

44. “Inscrutability and Its Discontents,” *Noûs *39 (2005): 397-425.

45. “There are Many Things,” in Judith Jarvis Thomson and Alex Byrne, eds., *Content and Modality *(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 93-122.

46. “There’s a Rule for Everything” in Agustín Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano, eds., *Absolute **Generality *(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 179-202.

**Reviews: **

1. Review of *The Liar *by Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, *The Philosophical Review *100 (1991), pp. 472-74.

2. Review of various articles by Artemov and Vardanyan on the modal logic of provability, *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 56 (1991), pp. 329-32.

3. Review of *The Concept of Logical Consequence *by John Etchemendy, *Journal of Symbolic Logic *57 (1992), pp. 254-55.

4. Review of *If *P, *then *Q by David Sanford, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research *53 (1993), pp. 239-42.

5. Review of *A Theory of Counterfactuals *by Igal Kvart, *Philosophy of Science *60 (1993), pp. 518-19.

6. Review of *Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality *by Robert Koons, *Mind *102 (1993), pp.407-10.

7. Review of *Sets *by Michael Potter and of articles by van Aken and Pollard on the axiomatization of set theory, *Journal of Symbolic Logic *58 (1993), pp. 1077-78.

8. Review of *A Structuralist Theory of Logic *by Arnold Koslow, *Journal of Philosophy *90 (1993), pp. 271-74.

9. Review of *Logic, Logic, and Logic *by George Boolos, *Bulletin of Symbolic Logic *6 (2001): 58-62.

10. Review of *The Revision Theory of Truth *by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research *56 (1996): 727-30.

11. Review of the second edition of *The Concept of Logical Consequence *by John Etchemendy, *Bulletin of Symbolic Logic *6 (2001): 379-80.

12. Review of *Vagueness *by Timothy Williamson (with Brian P. McLaughlin), *Linguistics and Philosophy *21 (1998), pp. 221-35.

13. “Logical Commitment: A Reply to Williamson” (with Brian P. McLaughlin), *Linguistics and Philosophy *27 (2004): 123-36.

14. Review of *The Limits of Abstraction *by Kit Fine, *Philosophia Mathematica *12 (2004): 278-84.