Faculty
Robert Stalnaker: List of Publications
April 2009
BOOKS (including edited books)
A. Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time (edited with William Harper and Glenn Pearce). Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981.
B. Inquiry . Cambridge, Mass., Bradford Books, MIT Press, 1984.
C. Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.
D. Fact and Value (edited, with Alexander Byrne and Ralph Wedgwood). Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2000. (Festschrift for Judith Thomson)
E. Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-metaphysical Essays. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.
F. Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.
ARTICLES
1. “Events, Periods and Institutions in Historians’ Language.” History and Theory, 6(1967), 159-179.
2. “A Theory of Conditionals.” Studies in Logical Theory (N. Rescher, ed.), Oxford, 1968, 98-112. (Reprinted in [A], and in E. Sosa(ed.), Causation and Conditionals (Oxford Readings in Philosophy), London: Oxford U. Press, 1975.) and in Frank Jackson (ed.), Conditionals (Oxford Readings in Philosophy), Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.)
3. “Modality and Reference.” (with R. H. Thomason) Nous, 2(1968), 359-372.
4. “Abstraction in First Order Modal Logic.” (with R. H. Thomason) Theoria, 34(1968), 203-207.
5. “Wallace on Propositional Attitudes.” Journal of Philosophy, 66(1969), 803-806.
6. “Probability and Conditionals.” Philosophy of Science, 37 (1970), 64-80. (Reprinted in [A])
7. “A Semantic Analysis of Conditional Logic.” (with R. H. Thomason) Theoria, 36(1970). (Italian translation published in Claudio Pizzi(ed.), Leggi di Natura, Modalita, Ipotesi , Milan: Feltrinelli, 1978.)
8. “Pragmatics.” Synthese , 22(1970), 272-289. (reprinted in D. Davidson and G. Harman(eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972, A. P. Martinich(ed.), The Philosophy of Language (second edition), New York and Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1989, and in [C]. Italian translation published in Andrea Bonomi(ed.), La Struttura Logica Linguaggio, Milan: Valentino Bompiani, 1973.).
9. “A Semantic Theory of Adverbs.” (with R. H. Thomason) Linguistic Inquiry, 4(1973), 195-220.
10. “Presuppositions.” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2(1973), 447-457. (reprinted in D. Hockney, W. Harper and B. Freed(eds.), Contemporary Research in Philosophical and Linguistic Semantics, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975.).
11. “Pragmatic Presuppositions.” Semantics and Philosophy (Milton K. Munitz and Peter Unger, eds.), New York: New York U. Press, 1974, 197-213. (reprinted in Steven Davis, Pragmatics: A reader, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.), and n [C]
12. “Indicative Conditionals.” Philosophia, 5 (1975), 269-286. (reprinted in Asa Kasher(ed.), Language in Focus: Foundations, Methods and Systems, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976, 179-196, in [A], [C], and in Frank Jackson (ed.), Conditionals (Oxford Readings in Philosophy), Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.)
13. “Propositions.” Alfred MacKay and Daniel Merrill (eds.), Issues in the Philosophy of Language, New Haven and London: Yale U. Press, 1976, 79-91.
14. “Possible Worlds.” Nous, 10(1976), 65-75. (Reprinted in M. J. Loux(ed.), The Possible and the Actual, Ithaca and London: Cornell U. Press, 1979, and in Ted Honderich and Myles Burnyeat(eds.), Philosophy As It Is. Penguin. Polish translation in Tadeusza Szubki(ed.), Metafizyka W Filozofii Aanalitycznej. Lublin, 1995.)
15. “Complex Predicates.” The Monist, 60(1977), 327-339.
16. “Assertion.” Syntax and Semantics, 9(1978), 315-332. (Reprinted in Steven Davis, Pragmatics: A reader, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991., and in [C].).
17. “Anti-Essentialism.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4(1979), 343-355. (Reprinted in [E])
18. “Indexical Belief.” Synthese, 49(1981), 129-151. (Reprinted in [C].)
19. “Logical Semiotic.” E. Agazzio(ed.), Modern Logic – A Survey, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981, 439-456.
20. “A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle.” [A], 87-104.
21. “Possible Worlds and Situations.” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15 (1986), 109-123.
22. “Counterparts and Identity.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11, Studies in Essentialism (1987). (Reprinted in [E])
23. “Replies to Schiffer and Field.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1987)., 113-123.
24. “Semantics for Belief.” Philosophical Topics, 15(1987), 177-190. (Reprinted in [C].)
25. “Belief Attribution and Context.” Robert Grimm and Daniel Merrill(eds.), Contents of Thought , Tucson: U. of Arizona Press, 1988, 140-156. (Reprinted in [C].)
26. “Vague Identity.” David Austin(ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988, 349-360. (Reprinted in [E])
27. Critical notice of D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds. Mind (1988), 117-128.
28. “On What’s In the Head.” Philosophical Perspectives, 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (1989), 287-316. (Reprinted in David M. Rosenthal(ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, and in [C].)
29. “Mental Content and Linguistic Form.” Philosophical Studies, 58(1990), 129-146. (Reprinted in [C].)
30. “Narrow Content.” C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens(eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The role of content in logic, language and mind, Stanford: CSLI, 1990, 131-146. (Reprinted in [C].)
31. “How To Do Semantics for the Language of Thought.” Barry Loewer and Georges Rey, Meaning and Mind: Fodor and his Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, 229-237.
32. “The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I.” Synthese , 89(1991), 425-440. (Reprinted in [C].)
33. “Notes on Conditional Semantics,” in Yoram Moses(ed.) Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc., 1992, 316-327.
34. Critical notice of David Sanford, If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 33(1992), 291-297.
35. “Twin Earth Revisited,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1993), 297-311. (Reprinted in [C].)
36. “What is the Representational Theory of Thinking? A Comment on William G. Lycan.” Mind and Language, 8(1993), 423-430.
37. “A Note on Nonmonotonic Modal Logic, Artificial Intelligence, 64(1993), 183-196.
38. “What is a Non-monotonic Consequence Relation?” Fundamenta Informaticae, 21(1994).
39. “On the Evaluation of Solution Concepts,” Theory and Decision, 37(1994), 49-73. Revised version in Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions, ed. by M. O. L. Bacharach, L.-A. Gérard-Varet, P. Mongin and H. S. Shin. Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1997, 345-64.
40. “Conditionals as Random Variables” (with R. C. Jeffrey) in Probability and Conditionals: belief revision and rational decision., ed. by B. Skyrms and E. Eells. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 31-46.
41. “The Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity,” Modality, Morality and Belief: essays in honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus , ed. by W. Sinnott-Armstrong, D. Raffman, and N. Asher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 12-28. (Reprinted in [E])
42. “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be,” Benacerraf and his Critics, ed. by Adam Morton and Stephen Stich. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1996, 103-119. Reprinted in [E])
43. “On a Defense of the Hegemony of Representation,” Perception, ed. by Enrique Villanueva. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1996, 101-108.
44. “Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games,” Economics and Philosophy, 12(1996), 133-162.
45. “Impossibilities” Philosophical Topics, 24 (1996), 193-204. (Reprinted in [E])
46. “Varieties of Supervenience,” Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics (1996), 221-241. (Reprinted in [E])
47. “On the Representation of Context,” Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 7(1998), 3-19. (Reprinted in [C].)
48. “Los nombres y la referencia: semántica y metasemántica,” Theorema, 17(1998), 7-19. (Spanish translation of a paper based on [iv].
49. “Belief Revision in Games: Forward and Backward Induction,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 36(1998), 31-56.
50. “What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?” Concepts, ed. by Enrique Villanueva. Atascadero, CA, Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1998, 339-52. (Reprinted in Y. Gunther, Essays in Nonconceptual Content, MIT Press, 2003, 95-106
51. “Extensive and Strategic Forms: Games and Models for Games.” Research in Economics, 53(1999), 293-319.
52. “Dualism, Conceptual Analysis and the Explanatory Gap” (with Ned Block), Philosophical Review, 108(1999), 1-46.
53. “Logical Omniscience, II” in [C], 255-73.
54. “Comparing Qualia Across Persons,” Philosophical Topics , 26(2000), 385-405. Reprinted in [E])
55. “On Moore’s Paradox,” Believing and Accepting, ed. by Pascal Engel (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), 93-100.
56. “On Considering a Possible World as Actual,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 75(2001), 141-156. Reprinted in [E])
57. “Metaphysics without Conceptual Analysis,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(2001), 631-636.
58. “Epistemic Consequentialism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 76(2002), 153-168.
59. “What Is it like to Be a Zombie?” in Conceivability and Possibility ed. by John Hawthorne and Tamar Szabo Gendler. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 385-400. Reprinted in [E])
60. “Common Ground,” Linguistics and Philosophy 25(2002), 701-721.
61. “Conceptual Truth and Metaphysical Necessity,” (2003) in [E].
62. “On Thomas Nagel’s Objective Self.” (2003) in [E].
63. “Comments on ‘From Contextualism to Contrastivism in Epistemology’. Philosophical Studies (2003).
64. “Lewis on Intentionality,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(2004), 199-212. Reprinted in F. Jackson and G. Priest, Lewisian Themes: the philosophy of David Lewis. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 231-244.
65. “Assertion Revisited: on the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics,” Philosophical Studies 118(2004), 299-322.
66. “Conditional assertions and conditional propositions” in New Work on Modality (MIT Working Papers in Linguistics and Philosophy, 51 , 2005)
67. “Saying and meaning, cheap talk and credibility” in Game Theory and Pragmatics ed.by A. Benz, G. Jager and R. van Rooij (New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).
68. “On Logics of Knowledge and Belief, Philosophical Studies 120(2006), 169-199.
69. “Ways a World Might Be”, Philosophical Studies 133(2007) 439-441. (Precis of [E] for book symposium)
70. “Responses”, Philosophical Studies 133(2007) 481-491. (for book symposium on [E])
71. “Responses”, in Content and Modality: Themes from the philosophy of Robert Stalnaker ed. by J. Thomson and A. Byrne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
72. “Critical Notice of Scott Soames’s Case against Two-Dimensionalism” Philosophical Review 116(2007) 255-266.
73. “What is de re belief?” in The Philosophy of David Kaplan, ed. By J. Almog and P. Leonardi. Oxford University Press, 2009.
74. “A response to Abbott on presupposition and common ground” Linguistics and Philosophy, 31(2009), 539-44.
75. “Iterated Belief Revision” Erkenntnis, 70 (2009), 189-209.
76. “On Hawthorne and Magidor on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility” Mind (forthcoming).
77. “The metaphysical conception of analyticity” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming). (contribution to a book symposium on T. Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy. )
78. “Merely possible propositions” in Modality: metaphysics, logic and epistemology, ed. by B. Hale and A. Hoffmann. Oxford University Press (forthcoming, November, 2009)
HANDBOOK AND ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES
i. “Pragmatik.” J. Speck(ed.), Handbuch Wissenschaftstheoretisher Begriffe, 1975, 501-506.
ii. “Robert Stalnaker,” Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed. by S. Guttenplan. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1994, 561-568.
iii. “Modality and Possible Worlds,” Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics, ed. by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1994, 333-337.
iv. “Reference and Necessity,” Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language. ed. by Crispin Wright and Bob Hale. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1997, 534-554. (Reprinted in [E].
v. “Logical Omniscience, Problem of” The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science ed. by R. Wilson and F. Keil. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1999, 489-90.
vi. “Propositional Attitudes,” The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science ed. by R. Wilson and F. Keil. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1999, 678-79.
vii. “David Lewis,” Blackwell Companion to Analytic Philosophy, ed. by David Sosa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 2001, 478-488.